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Foreign official purchases of U.S. government bonds have an economically large and statistically significant
impact on long-term interest rates.  Federal Reserve credibility, as evidenced by dramatic reductions
in both long-term inflation expectations and the volatility of long rates, contributed much to the decline
of long rates in the 1990s.  More recently, however, foreign flows have become important.  Controlling
for various factors given by a standard macroeconomic model, we estimate that had there been no
foreign official flows into U.S. government bonds over the past year, the 10-year Treasury yield would












  For emerging market economies, there is a burgeoning literature on the impact of 
international capital flows.  For example, we have learned in recent years that in 
emerging markets foreign flows can result in a reduction in systematic risk (Chari and 
Henry, 2004) and an increase in both physical investment (Henry 2000, 2003) and 
economic growth (Bekaert, Harvey, and Lundblad, 2005).  These positive aspects of 
capital flows are tempered by the role of foreign flows in spreading crises.
1   
In contrast, much less is known about the impact of capital flows on the larger 
economies of the world.  To be sure, we know that even in the largest countries foreign 
flows can cause disruption—witness the ERM crisis of the early 1990s (Eichengreen, 
2000)—but outside of extreme situations, evidence of any meaningful impact of capital 
flows on large economies is scarce.  Indeed, until recently many market participants held 
the view that capital flows could not possibly impact interest rates in the United States.
2 
   In this paper we present evidence that international capital flows have an 
economically important effect on the most important price in the largest economy in the 
world, that of the ten-year U.S. Treasury bond.  Specifically, we ascertain the extent to 
which foreign flows into U.S. government bond markets can help explain movements in 
long-term Treasury yields.  We address this issue at an important time.  Not long ago, in 
the summer of 2003, short-term interest rates were very low and inflation was well 
contained.  Over the course of 2004, the Federal Reserve began a well advertised 
                                                 
1  See, for example, Boyer, Kumagai, and Yuan (2005) and the substantial literature on sudden stops 
(among many others, Calvo (1998) and Mendoza and Smith (2006)). 
2 For example, as reported in “Their Money, Our Strength” (Wall Street Journal, August 5, 2004), David 
Malprass, Chief Economist of Bear Stearns, stated that “U.S. bond yields…have fluctuated over a wide 
range in response to many factors…but foreign buying…ha(s) simply not had much impact.  Foreigners 
don’t have much influence…”  Many others made similar statements (although perhaps less forcefully).   2 
 
tightening cycle that raised short rates while economic growth strengthened and inflation 
picked up, and many market observers predicted an increase in long-term U.S. interest 
rates that would result in substantial losses on bond positions (see, for example, Roach 
(2005a)).  However, long-term interest rates remained quite low, puzzling market 
participants, financial economists, and policymakers.   
  We make three contributions to the literature.  First, we provide a straightforward 
empirical presentation of the interest rate implications of the standard IS/LM model.  Our 
second, and main, contribution is to show—by extending the empirical model—that 
foreign flows have had a statistically and economically significant impact on U.S. long-
term rates.  Our third contribution is ancillary but nevertheless important.  Although the 
use of capital flows data has skyrocketed in recent years in both practitioner and 
academic circles, there is considerable confusion about such data.  We address this by 
first highlighting some less-than-desirable features of reported capital flows data and then 
presenting alternative measures designed to address the deficiencies. 
We begin by estimating a standard model without foreign flows.  The standard 
model illustrates two important points.  First, the most important factor contributing to 
the decline in nominal long-term interest rates from 9 percent in 1987 to roughly 5 
percent by the end of the 1990s is the improved credibility of Fed policy (as measured by 
reductions in both long-term inflation expectations and the volatility of long rates).
3  A 
sharp improvement in the fiscal situation also helped for a period, although most of those 
gains later evaporated.  Second, at times rates seem to deviate substantially from the 
                                                 
3 This is consistent with the view that the fixing of policy and inflation expectations was a crowning 
accomplishment of the Greenspan Fed (Poole, 2005).  On the importance of fixing expectations when 
conducting monetary policy, see Eggertsson and Woodford (2003a, 2003b), Svensson (2001, 2003), and 
Krugman (1998).   3 
 
standard model.  For example,  over the past two years many factors have pointed toward 
higher long rates—monetary policy has been substantially tightened, the fiscal situation 
has shifted from surpluses to deficits, and inflation and growth expectations have 
increased—but an increase in long rates has not materialized.
4 
We then extend the model to include foreign flows.  To determine the impact of 
foreign flows on long-term U.S. interest rates, two necessary conditions must be satisfied.  
First, the impact must be detectable in that foreigners must be a large enough portion of 
the market to plausibly impact prices.  Foreigners in U.S. debt markets pass this test, as 
they own just over half of the Treasury bond market.  Second, exogenous foreign demand 
must be identifiable.  In Bernanke, Reinhart, and Sack (2004), exogenous foreign flows 
are identified through an event study approach that relies on known foreign exchange 
interventions by the Japanese government.  However, the opportunity to use such a 
strategy is necessarily limited.  The Japanese authorities acquire many U.S. Treasury 
bonds outside of announced interventions, and most other foreign governments 
accumulate U.S. securities in a more stealth manner.  Our identification strategy relies 
instead on the flows of foreign government institutions, which include (but are not 
limited to) accumulation by the Bank of Japan and the People’s Bank of China, as well as 
the recycling of petrodollars.  These flows are exogenous to our model because very few 
governments treat their foreign reserves as a portfolio to optimize; foreign governments 
typically have very broad objective functions that place a substantial weight on the likely 
impact of domestic economic policies (Dooley, Folkerts-Landau, and Garber, 2004). 
Our results with foreign flows are striking.  We find in our sample spanning 
January 1984 to May 2005 that foreign inflows into U.S. bonds reduce the 10-year 
                                                 
4 This is the “conundrum” of long-term U.S. interest rates (Greenspan, 2005).   4 
 
Treasury yield by an economically and statistically significant amount.  For example, if 
foreign governments did not accumulate U.S. government bonds over the twelve months 
ending May 2005, our model suggests that the 10-year Treasury yield would have been 
90 basis points higher.  Further analysis indicates that roughly two-thirds of this impact 
comes directly from East Asian sources.  Were foreigners to reverse their flows and sell 
U.S. bonds in similar magnitudes, the estimated impact would be doubled. 
Our paper’s third contribution is ancillary but nevertheless important.  We form 
“benchmark-consistent” capital flows measures that address issues with reported capital 
flows data.  For the purpose of our study, the official source of U.S. capital flows, the 
Treasury International Capital Reporting System (TIC) data, has two deficiencies: (i) it 
cannot differentiate between foreign officials and other investors when the transaction 
goes through a third-country intermediary and (ii) TIC-reported flows greatly 
overestimate foreign purchases of certain types of U.S. government bonds.  Because 
some prominent foreign governments purchase U.S. securities through offshore centers, 
recorded foreign official inflows represent only a lower bound.
5  On the other hand, the 
TIC data records far too many inflows into U.S. agency bonds.  In particular, we show 
that in the one-year period from mid-2001 to mid-2002, capital inflows into U.S. agency 
bonds were overstated by $158 billion.
6  Our benchmark-consistent flows, described in 
full detail in the appendix, address both of these deficiencies.   
  Our results are robust to many alternative specifications.  We impose a structure 
that is consistent with the potential non-stationarity of nominal rates, but to alleviate any 
                                                 
5 Roach (2005b) states that U.S. data do not capture any of the roughly $700 billion in oil proceeds that 
may have been recycled into U.S. Treasuries in 2005.  See also Economist (2005b). 
6 Given questions about whether long-term inflows can cover the U.S. current account deficit (Feldstein, 
2006), a $158 billion overstatement in a twelve-month period is both sizeable and important.   5 
 
lingering stationarity concerns we also model real rates.  To eliminate the impact of 
short-run business cycle variations, we go a step further and model future expected real 
rates (the real 5-year forward rate five years hence).  We present evidence that a view 
circulated in practitioner circles—that corporate savings importantly influence long rates 
(JP Morgan, 2005)—does not impact our results (nor does it appear to help explain the 
behavior of long rates).  We also include interest rate differentials or the real exchange 
rate and, to alleviate potential concerns about structural breaks, re-estimate starting the 
sample at two significant events, when Greenspan became Chairman in August 1987 and 
when the Fed began announcing the target federal funds rate in February 1994.  None of 
the robustness checks alter our main results. 
  Our results are also consistent with the notion that foreign flows are behind some 
of the recent flattening of the yield curve.  We estimate models for a variety of U.S. 
interest rates—shorter term Treasury yields (2-year), high and lower quality corporate 
debt (Aaa and Baa), and long-term fixed and short-term adjustable mortgage rates.  The 
impact of foreign inflows differs across these instruments, but it is always statistically 
significant and often economically large.  The impact on corporate bond rates and 
long-term (30-year) fixed mortgage rates is very similar to that on the 10-year Treasury 
yield, but we find that short-term rates are less affected by foreign flows, perhaps because 
they are deeper markets that are more closely linked to the federal funds rate.  The 
differential effect on the two- and ten-year Treasury yields implies that over the past year 
foreign flows have flattened the yield curve by about 50 basis points. 
Our work is related to a number of strands of the literature.  Our standard model 
(without foreign flows) complements recent work that utilizes affine models with factors   6 
 
that are often unobservable (Diebold, Piazzesi, and Rudebusch, 2005; Piazzesi, 2005).  
Bernanke et al. (2004), perhaps the closest precursor to our work, utilizes an affine term 
structure model to identify (domestic) macroeconomic factors that impact yields and, 
separarately, includes a high frequency study of the short-run impact of announced 
Japanese intervention.
7  Our work is also related but distinctly separate from the recent 
literature on the impact of order flow on exchange rates (Evans, 2002; Evans and Lyons, 
2002) and Treasury yields (Brandt and Kavajecz, 2004; Green, 2004).
8   
Our work can be seen as encompassing certain aspects of the notion of a global 
saving glut.  Bernanke (2005) argues that two important factors in the global saving glut 
story are the sharp reserve accumulation by developing countries and the surge in 
revenues of oil producers.  Both mechanisms are incorporated directly in our preferred 
measure of foreign official inflows, and our analysis suggests that East Asian 
accumulation is responsible for about two-thirds of our estimated impact.  To the extent 
that many oil producers and some developing countries shun U.S. intermediaries, our 
benchmark-consistent capital flows series is necessary to capture these flows. 
  Our paper is as follows.  In the next section, we lay out interest rate implications 
from the standard IS/LM model, show how we operationalize the model, and provide our 
baseline estimates.  In Section III, we present our main regression results with foreign 
flows, as well as various robustness checks.  Section IV presents regression results for a 
broader range of U.S. interest rates.  Section V concludes.  In an appendix we discuss 
                                                 
7  The simplicity of our model does not overly handicap our analysis, as the fit of our baseline model 
(without flows) is comparable to that of the affine term structure statistical model of Bernanke et al. (2004). 
8  Order flow research, which examines the impact of flows on prices, is distinct from our work because it 
identifies flows that are driven by private information.  We cannot make such statements about our flows 
data, nor can most researchers; even the recent Evans and Lyons (2005) cannot identify true order flow.   7 
 
problems with reported capital flows data and then show how to restate the data to bring 
them in line with higher quality (but infrequent) benchmark surveys. 
 
II. A Baseline Model of U.S. Long-Term Interest Rates 
In this section we present the baseline empirical model, which can be thought of 
as a parsimonious representation of the IS/LM model presented in macroeconomics 
textbooks, and estimate the model for the period January 1984–May 2005. 
 
II.A. Operationalizing the Standard IS/LM 
The standard IS/LM model can be written as follows:
9  
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9 For a more complete treatment, see Abel and Bernanke (2005), Mishkin (2006), or any intermediate 
macroeconomics textbook.   8 
 
The constants measure autonomous consumption (c0), investment (i0), taxes (t0), and 
exports (x0); the (negative of the) sensitivity of spending to changes in interest rates (cr, ir, 
xr); and, for money demand, the autonomous component (l0) and its sensitivity to nominal 
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In the short-run IS/LM model, prices are assumed to be fixed, but the model can be 
appended to include a price-adjustment mechanism that kicks in when the economy is 
away from its full employment level; for example, prices can be assumed to increase 
when the economy is operating above potential.   
  The IS/LM is simple—dynamics are limited to the assumption concerning price 
adjustment—but it provides a reasonable structural specification of interest rates.  It 
predicts that, all else equal, long-term real interest rates will increase if any of the 
following increases: expected future output or wealth (both of which raise c0), 
government budget deficit, or expected future productivity (raises i0).  In addition, 
anything that results in an exogenous increase in net exports would raise interest rates.  
Further, interest rates will increase if any of the following occurs: monetary policy is   9 
 
tightened, price level increases, expected inflation decreases, or output is beyond its full-
employment level.
10 
When bringing the standard model to the data, we do not aim to include every 
possible variable that could fit into the IS/LM framework; some degree of parsimony is, 
as always, desirable.  Moreover, because interest rates are forward-looking asset prices, 
we try to rely on variables that encompass forward-looking expectations or at least can be 
observed in real time. 
Some of the relevant variables correspond nicely with available data.  Short-term 
(i.e., one-year-ahead) expectations of future output (
e
t y 1 + ) and inflation (
e
t 1 + π ) are 
available monthly from the Blue Chip survey.  Long-term (ten-year) inflation 
expectations ( 10
e
t π + ) are presented in the Philadelphia Fed’s Survey of Professional 
Forecasters; we interpolate them to monthly figures.
11  We measure current monetary 
policy with the target federal funds rate (fft) rather than money supply.  The credibility of 
monetary policy—important because interest rates are forward looking asset prices—can 
be captured in part by what we will call an interest rate risk premium (rpt), which we 
measure as the volatility of long-term interest rates (calculated as the rolling 36-month 
standard deviation of changes in long rates).
12  The stance of fiscal policy is a bit trickier 
to capture.  Laubach (2003) utilizes the long-dated budget projections of the 
Congressional Budget Office (CBO) or Office of Management and Budget (OMB), but 
these projections are not available to us.  Instead, we use a readily available measure, the 
                                                 
10 An increase in expected inflation, which decreases real rates as money demand falls, will increase 
nominal rates (but less than one-for-one) as long as the IS curve is not vertical (i.e., as long as spending is 
sensitive to interest rate changes). 
11  Ang, Bekaert, and Wei (2005) show that surveys forecast inflation quite well.  Another measure of 
inflation expectations, TIPS, are not yet usable for time series analysis (Kwan, 2005), but are showing 
similar levels as the survey data we use. 
12 This risk premium in effect proxies for interest-rate and reinvestment risk.   10 
 
CBO’s series on the structural budget deficit (deficitt-1) expressed as a percent of lagged 
GDP, which we interpolate to the monthly frequency.  Our measure has one thing in 
common with the long-dated projections; being structural, it abstracts from current 
business cycle conditions.
13 
The impact of foreign economies on domestic interest rates in the standard IS/LM 
model is entirely through demand for domestic products.  To the extent that a 
depreciation—caused perhaps by interest rate differentials—raises net exports, it would 
be associated with rising real interest rates.  Similarly, an increase in foreign output, to 
the extent it falls on domestic goods, would tend to increase domestic interest rates.  
Along these lines, we could include in our baseline specification a real exchange rate or 
interest rate differentials (or both).  In practice, measures of expected future output 
should pick up both of these features of the open economy IS/LM model—survey 
respondents are not asked to disregard output that serves foreign demand.
14 
Two variables in the standard IS/LM model are difficult to pin down.  One is 
expected future productivity.  Not only is current productivity difficult to measure, but in 
practice its impact in this model depends crucially on how it is perceived by individuals 
and firms.  As Kohn (2003) points out, with lags in economic responses, a surge in 
productivity could be associated with either an increase or decrease in interest rates 
(depending on which aspects of the economy happen to adjust faster), making it very 
difficult to gauge the real-time impact of productivity on interest rates.  Here again we 
rely on one-year ahead growth expectation to serve as a reasonable proxy.  The other 
difficult-to-measure variable is whether output is beyond its full employment level.  
                                                 
13  Moreover, as we will show, our estimates of the impact of budget deficits on interest rates are not 
dissimilar from those in Laubach (2003) or, by extension, Engen and Hubbard (2004). 
14 As we will show, interest rate differentials or exchange rates do not change our main conclusions.   11 
 
Indeed, Orphanides and van Orden (2004) show that real-time forecasts of the output gap 
are relatively uninformative.  Fortunately, here too we have an alternative.  In the 
theoretical model, the output gap impacts interest rates only through inflation 
expectations, which we include directly. 
 
II.B. Estimating the Standard IS/LM 
The preceding discussion suggests that in a baseline monthly model the 10-year 
Treasury yield is a function of expected growth, expected inflation, a risk premium, and 
monetary and fiscal policy.  For expected inflation, we use both a long-term (10-year) 
measure and, because long-term expectation evolve only slowly, a shorter-term (one-
year) one that we express relative to long-term expectations ( 11 0
ee
tt π π + + − ). 
Explanatory variables are presented in Figure 1.  A primary driver in the longer-
term secular decline in nominal rates could well be the credibility of the Greenspan Fed.  
Indeed, the extent to which long-term term inflation expectations (Fig. 1a) and interest 
rate movements (Fig. 1b) have been stabilized is remarkable.  Long-term inflation 
expectations were at 4.5 percent when Greenspan took office; by 1999 they had fallen to 
2.5 percent, where they have remained ever since.  Similarly, the volatility of long rates 
fell roughly in half from the time Greenspan became Chairman to 1991, and have 
remained more or less constant since.
15  The more benign budget situation (Fig. 1c) over 
the latter half of the 1990s also likely helped bring long rates down, although most of the 
fiscal improvement has since reversed.  Finally, Figure 1d depicts what many have 
focused on as a major recent surprise.  The Fed has tightened considerably since mid-
                                                 
15  Figures 1a and 1b make an important point.  Increased Fed credibility may have helped reduce long-term 
interest rates over the course of the 1990s, but by these measures there was no further gain from credibility 
since 1999.   12 
 
2004, and in most previous tightening episodes, a sharp increase in short rates such as we 
have witnessed over the past year would have resulted in a sizeable increase in long rates.  
But, this time, despite the sharp tightening of monetary policy, long rates have remained 
more or less constant at a historically low level. 
A final technical note before we turn to the baseline regressions.  When modeling 
nominal rates we impose an assumption about the long-run relationship between interest 
rates and inflation expectations that is consistent with the work of Mehra (1998).  In 
particular, we assume that Treasury yields are non-stationary and are cointegrated with 
the federal funds rate and expected inflation by imposing that the coefficients on those 
two variables sum to one.
16  As we will show, when we model real interest rates, which 
are stationary, our main results hold. 
  Table 1 presents regression results for the baseline model of nominal and real 10-
year Treasury yields estimated using month-average data from January 1984 to May 
2005.  For nominal long rates (column 1), the most significant drivers of long-term 
Treasury yields are expected long-run inflation, the risk premium, the size of the 
structural budget deficit, and the level of the federal funds rate.  Declining interest rate 
volatility lowers long rates, and, in line with the results in Laubach (2003), a one-
percentage-point increase in the deficit-to-GDP ratio increases long rates by 24 basis 
points.  A one-percentage-point increase in long-term inflation expectations tends to 
increase nominal long rates by 57 basis points, and one percentage point of Fed 
tightening results in a 43 basis point increase.  The estimates suggest that much of the 
                                                 
16 This restriction assumes that real interest rates are stationary.  It can be shown that imposing this 
restriction is identical to estimating the regression on the yield curve slope, with one of the regressors equal 
to the deviation of the federal funds rate from the long-run inflation rate.  One could argue that all of the 
variables from this alternative regression are stationary.  Moreover, if this restriction were not imposed, the 
impact of long-run inflation expectations would become implausibly large.   13 
 
decrease in long rates through the 1990s may have owed to improved Fed credibility: the 
substantial decrease in long-term inflation expectations and long rate volatility accounts 
for about half of the decrease in long rates over the decade.
17  
Real long-term rates, defined as 
e
t i 10 10 + −π , have fluctuated within a band between 
2 and 4 percent over the sample period.  The regression (column 2) shows that real rates 
are also significantly impacted by the risk premium and the federal funds rate.  In contrast 
to nominal rates, higher expected growth, but not higher budget deficits, is associated 
with higher real rates.  
 
III. The Impact of Foreign Flows on U.S. Interest Rates 
  The standard macro model provides a reasonable representation of movements in 
long-term interest rates.  However, given recent conditions, it predicts rising rates over 
the past few years when in actuality rates have remained roughly constant.  In this section 
we append to the baseline model measures of exogenous foreign flows.  We also present 
alternative models as robustness checks. 
 
III.A. Foreign Inflows and Long-term Treasury Yields 
  Whether foreign inflows impact Treasury yields is an open question.  Moreover, 
to our knowledge, little if any academic work has been done on this topic, perhaps 
because capital flows data are not easily interpretable.
18  
                                                 
17 One could also argue that a dearth of shocks buffeting the economy played a role, although that is not 
directly testable using our model. 
18  One exception is Chinn and Frankel (2005), who speculate that recent capital flows might be diluting 
traditional interest rate relationships.   14 
 
  In this section we present our extended regression model, which uses (alternately) 
two measures of capital flows, depicted in Figure 2, that are intended to capture any 
systematic effects of exogenous inflows on Treasury yields.  The first measure is our 
adjusted series on foreign accumulation of U.S. government bonds, which we call 
benchmark-consistent flows; these are discussed in detail in the appendix.  The second is 
the TIC-reported series on foreign official purchases of U.S. government bonds.  As the 
discussion in the appendix makes clear, we consider the benchmark-consistent flows to 
be the more accurate and the TIC-reported official flows to be a lower bound. 
  Regression results for the extended model of 10-year yield that includes foreign 
flows (constructed as twelve-month flows scaled by lagged GDP) are presented in Table 
2.  For nominal rates (columns 1 and 2), as in the domestic model, the coefficients on 
expected inflation, the risk premium, the size of the budget deficit, and the level of the 
federal funds rate are highly significant.  In addition, expected growth becomes 
significant in these models.  Because the coefficients on ( 11 0
ee
tt π π + + − ) and  10
e
t π +  are of 
similar magnitudes, in these specifications short-term inflation expectations appear to be 
substantial drivers of nominal long rates (perhaps because they adjust more rapidly).  
Notably, both foreign flow variables exhibit a significant negative impact on long rates.  
Results for real rates (columns 3 and 4) are similar.  Compared to the regressions for 
nominal rates, the coefficient estimates on the foreign flows variables are smaller, but 
foreign flows still significantly impact real long-term rates.  
  The coefficients on our two measures of capital flows differ substantially, but 
their impact on long-term nominal rates is very similar (Figure 3a).  Note that the graph is 
constructed to show how much lower U.S. rates are in comparison with the case of zero   15 
 
inflows.  Using benchmark-consistent flows, had the last twelve months seen zero foreign 
official purchases of U.S. Treasury and agency bonds, our estimates suggest that ceteris 
paribus U.S. long rates would be 92 basis points higher.
19  The impact using TIC-reported 
foreign official flows—which, as noted, represent a lower bound—is currently 74 basis 
points.  The impact of reported TIC official inflows peaked in the summer of 2004 at 
about 125 basis points; the reduced impact since then could owe in part to increased 
avoidance of U.S. intermediaries by foreign governments, especially those that are 
recycling petrodollars. 
  Figure 3b indicates that the model with foreign flows tracks long-run rates well 
(but not perfectly), and that recent long-term rates are more or less in line with 
fundamentals.
20  To be sure, the figure shows that the model could be improved, as a 
surge in rates in the mid-1990s is not picked up by the model. 
   Our results might strike the reader as being large.  But, as Table 3 shows, 
foreigners have become major participants in U.S. bond markets, holding over half the 
U.S. Treasury bond market and almost one-quarter of all U.S. bonds.  Gone are the days 
of the late 1970s when foreigners held less than 5 percent of the U.S. bond market.  
Moreover, our results are in line with those of other researchers.  For example, Laubach 
(2003) found that a one-percentage-point increase in the budget deficit would increase 
long rates by 25 basis points.  Over the course of 2002 and 2003 the budget deficit 
increased from near zero to 4 percent of GDP, which, according to the Laubach 
estimates, would imply a 100-basis-point impact on long rates.  If we witnessed a 
                                                 
19 Were foreign purchases to reverse to similarly sized sales, the impact would be double (184 basis points). 
20 In an earlier version (Warnock and Warnock, 2005), we included foreign flows into U.S. corporate bonds 
in our flows measures.  This completely eliminated the current conundrum, but because we cannot be 
certain that those flows can be treated as exogenous to our model, we do not present them in this paper.   16 
 
similarly dramatic movement in foreign flows, our results would imply a similar impact 
on long rates.  Bernanke et al. (2004), in an event study of Japanese announced 
interventions, found that each $1 billion of intervention in the Treasury market depressed 
U.S. long rates by 0.7 basis points.  Foreign inflows of $100 billion a year (or even $200 
billion) are not uncommon, so our magnitudes are not exorbitant when compared with 
those in Bernanke et al. (2004).  Indeed, one interpretation is that our results generalize 
their event study findings. 
  The reader might wonder where the foreign flows are coming from.  While 
country attribution is arguably the weakest aspect of the TIC data, it tends to be of decent 
quality for a group of countries in East Asia.  Panel A of Figure 4 decomposes foreign 
inflows into U.S. government bonds into those arising from Japan, China, Hong Kong, 
Taiwan, and Korea (thick line) and those arising from other countries (thin line).  From 
the former group comes the vast majority of foreign official accumulation of U.S bonds; 
East Asian purchases peaked in the summer of 2004, when Japanese accumulation 
slowed considerably.  The latter group includes, among other things, the recycling of 
petrodollars; these other inflows are still surging, perhaps owing to rising oil revenues.  
  Accordingly, the impact of East Asian accumulation (Panel B) is currently only 
55 basis points, down from a high of 130 basis points, while other inflows are now 
accountable for a 31 basis point reduction of the 10-year yield.




                                                 
21 Impacts are computed from a model (not shown, but available from the authors) that is identical to that of 
Table 2 column 1, with the exception that the flows are broken out into East Asian and Other.  The 
coefficients are -0.45 (East Asia) and -0.13 (Other); both are highly significant.   17 
 
III.B. Alternative Specifications of the Extended Model 
  In this subsection we present some alternative specifications that we view as 
robustness checks.   
Do Corporate Savings Solve the Puzzle? 
  JPMorgan (2005) incorporates a measure of corporate savings into a model of 
long rates; see Economist (2005a).  The logic is that as the corporate sector moved from a 
net borrower in 2000 (with a financing gap of about 3 percent of GDP) to a net saver by 
2004 (a slightly negative financing gap), their reduced demand for capital should have 
put downward pressure on interest rates.   
  To test whether corporate savings, rather than foreign flows, helps explain the 
puzzle, we include a measure of the corporate financing gap (scaled by GDP).  Because 
the financing gap is available only quarterly, for this test we utilize a quarterly model.  
We find no evidence (Column 1, Table 4) that the increased corporate savings has put 
downward pressure on U.S. interest rates; indeed, the sign on the (insignificant) 
coefficient would suggest the opposite.  Foreign flows remain economically and 
statistically important.
22   
Eliminating the Effect of Short-run Business Cycle Variations 
To address any potential concerns about the impact of short-run dynamics and 
business cycle fluctuations on our regressions, we analyze real long-dated forward rates 
that help address any endogeneity concerns regarding our regressors.  Our earlier 
                                                 
22  We were surprised to find results that differed so greatly from those in JPMorgan (2005), so we 
investigated further.  We utilized, as they did, data on non-financial firms’ financing gap from the Federal 
Reserve’s Flow of Funds Accounts (Table F.102 line 59).  JPMorgan appends a measure for financial 
firms, although we were unable to uncover such a measure.  But their appended series is too similar to the 
reported one to explain the difference in results, which appears to owe to the sample; their sample extends 
back to 1959, and the few-year period ending 1984:Q1 experienced very high interest rates and a very high 
financing gap.   18 
 
regressions assume that the right-hand side variables do not respond contemporaneously 
to innovations to the interest rate, an assumption that is reasonable and widely used with 
regard to macroeconomic variables, which tend to be sluggish.  The assumption is 
somewhat less convincing, but is still maintained, with regard to survey expectations of 
macroeconomic variables and the current federal funds rate.  Modeling long-dated 
forward rates—specifically, the real 5-5 forward rate (i.e., the five-year rate five years 
hence)—using only longer-term explanatory variables alleviates this concern.
23   
Abstracting from business cycle considerations, real long-term forward rates are lower 
when risk premiums decrease and budget deficits are smaller (Column 2, Table 4).  
Moreover, the coefficient estimates on the foreign flows variables are consistent with our 
main results.  Even abstracting from the potentially confounding effects of business cycle 
fluctuations, foreign flows have a statistically and economically significant impact on 
U.S. interest rates. 
Alternative Samples 
   There were at least two important changes in monetary policy over the course of 
our sample.  In August 1987, Alan Greenspan became Chairman of the Federal Reserve 
Board.  In February 1994, the Fed began announcing the target Fed Funds rate; before 
then, market participants had to infer the Fed’s intentions by observing its actions in the 
market.  If we start our sample at either of these dates (Table 4, columns 3 and 4), our 
main results are unchanged. 
 
 
                                                 
23  Because data on 5-5 forward rates do not extend back to January 1984, we form these rates using the 
standard technique of Shiller, Campbell, and Schoenholtz (1983).   19 
 
Incorporating Interest Differentials and Exchange Rates 
  In the standard IS/LM model, interest rate differentials should impact the 
domestic interest rate only to the extent to which they impact the exchange rate.  In turn, 
the channel from the exchange rate to domestic interest rates should go through net 
exports, which is captured in our main regressions by the variable that measures expected 
growth.  That said, in Table 5 we directly include (real) interest rate differentials, r* - r, 
and the year-over-year change in the real exchange rate (rer).
24  The results are counter to 
what the model predicts.  That is, higher foreign interest rates (relative to U.S. rates) are 
associated with a decrease in U.S. rates, and an appreciation—which should switch 
demand from U.S. to foreign goods—is associated with higher U.S. rates.  Of course, our 
simple model cannot adequately pick up J-curve effects, which is one reason we prefer to 
rely on the expected growth variable in the baseline regressions. 
 
IV. The Impact of Foreign Inflows on Other U.S. Interest Rates 
  While the focus of our paper is on long-term Treasury yields, for further 
investigation we present results for other long-term interest rates as well as short-term 
rates.  Our regression specifications are as in the previous section, although we include 
one extra variable, t cycle , a real-time indicator of the state of the business cycle.
25  The 
                                                 
24 The (real) interest rate differential is the spread of foreign rates over U.S. rates, where foreign rates are 
computed as a simple average of long rates in Germany, Japan, and the UK.  Year-over-year changes in the 
real exchange rate are computed using the Federal Reserve’s broad real index, for which an increase 
represents dollar appreciation. 
25 Using real-time data from the Philadelphia Fed, we compute  t cycle  as the deviation of current real-time 
employment growth from its 36-month average.  There is a potential role for  t cycle  in our main 
regressions, as Gurkaynak, Sack, and Swanson (2005) show that long-term rates adjust to employment 
reports.  But including  t cycle  in our regressions for the 10-year Treasury yield would not alter our results,   20 
 
business cycle variable plays two roles in what follows.  When employment growth is 
very weak, risk premiums on some of the riskier bonds we consider below might widen, 
so Cycle may capture a risk premium effect (separate from the interest rate risk 
premium).  Also, when we turn to shorter rates that adjust very quickly, there is a chance 
that our expectations data are sluggish.  If so, the real-time business cycle variable could 
pick up instantaneous adjustments in expectations. 
 
IV. A. Results for Other Long-Term Rates 
  To see if our results also hold for a broader set of U.S. long-term interest rates, we 
re-estimate the regressions for corporate bond yields (for both Moody's Aaa and Baa) as 
well as a 30-year fixed mortgage rate.
26  The results are presented in Table 6.  While the 
coefficient estimates for some variables differ somewhat from those in our benchmark 
regressions, the drivers are similar.  In particular, these other long rates tend to be driven 
by inflation and growth expectations as well as risk premiums and policy variables.  
Moreover, foreign flows exhibit a substantial impact on these markets.   
 
IV. B. Results for Short-Term Rates 
  Short-term interest rates are more closely tied to the federal funds rate, so we 
expect the impact of foreign flows to be more muted.  Table 7 confirms this for both the 
2-year Treasury yield and the 1-year adjustable rate mortgage (ARM).  For both, the 
coefficient on the foreign flows variable is about half those in previous tables, while the 
                                                                                                                                                 
perhaps because Gurkaynak  et al. argue that surprises from employment reports impact long rates through 
changes in inflation expectations (for which we control). 
26 The corporate bond rate data is from the Federal Reserve Board H.15 statistical release 
(www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h15/).  Mortgage rate data are from Freddie Mac's Primary Mortgage 
Market Survey (www.freddiemac.com/pmms/pmms_archives.html).   21 
 
coefficient on the federal funds rate has increased substantially.  Note too that the 
coefficient on the business cycle indicator plays different roles in these regressions.  For 
ARMs, cyclical weakness is associated with higher rates, perhaps this owes to greater 
demand for the lower rates of ARMs when unemployment is temporarily high.  In 
contrast, for short-term Treasury yields, the coefficient on the business cycle indicator is 
positive; cyclical weakness is associated with a decrease in short rates. 
  A comparison of the coefficients on the foreign flows variables in Tables 7 and 2 
suggests that foreign flows can explain at least some of the recent flattening of the yield 
curve.  In the last year of our sample, the 10-year minus 2-year spread decreased by 147 
basis points.  Our regressions suggest that the differential impacts of foreign flows on 
these rates are associated with 52 basis points of this flattening. 
 
V.  Conclusion 
  This paper represents a first attempt at analyzing the impact of foreign flows on a 
large developed economy.  Past work has taught us much about the role of foreign 
investors in emerging markets.  We can now add our results to this literature: Foreign 
flows have an economically large and statistically significant impact on long-term U.S. 
interest rates. 
Our work also suggests that large foreign purchases of U.S. government bonds 
have contributed importantly to the low levels of U.S. interest rates observed over the 
past few years.  In the hypothetical case of zero foreign accumulation of U.S. government 
bonds over the course of an entire year, long rates would be almost 100 basis points 
higher.   Because some of the foreign flows owe to the recycling of petrodollars, our   22 
 
results suggest a mitigating factor that might be reducing some of the bite of higher oil 
prices. 
We caution that although we present a multitude of robustness tests, it is possible 
that our results overstate the effects of foreign flows.  One might suspect that other 
factors not completely captured by the regressors were putting downward pressure on 
interest rates over this period.  Those other factors include FOMC statements suggesting 
that policy accommodation would be removed only slowly, worries about the risk of 
deflation, or perhaps a more benign outlook for inflation than suggested by the 
Philadelphia Fed’s surveys.  Still, the facts we present are suggestive of sizeable effects 
and eminently plausible given that foreigners currently hold more than half of the U.S. 
Treasury bond market. 
We also remind the reader that the ceteris paribus caveat strongly applies to our 
partial equilibrium results.  We quantify the impact were all else to remain unchanged.  
However, were (for example) East Asian governments to spark the effect we presented, 
others could step in and buy, thereby alleviating the impact on U.S. rates.  We can think 
of these “others” as market participants, potentially attracted by higher yields, but the 
U.S. has one exceedingly large participant that could undo any potential effect: the 
Federal Reserve.  Were the Fed to view the subsequent increase in U.S. long rates as 
undesirable, it has the power to step in and buy either the exact Treasury securities being 
sold or near-substitutes such as agency bonds.
27  
The literature on capital flows is blossoming, and we leave plenty for future 
research.  It would be worthwhile to model private foreign flows to determine their 
impact on U.S. interest rates.  A model similar to ours could be applied to other countries, 
                                                 
27  See Warnock (2006) for a more complete discussion of potential Fed responses to foreign sales.   23 
 
although America’s exorbitant privilege (Gourinchas and Rey, 2006) and Burger and 
Warnock (2006) suggest that very few attract substantial foreign flows into their local 
currency bond markets.  Finally, foreign flows should be incorporated into affine term 
structure models, as more of them come to identify observable macroeconomic factors.   24 
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Appendix.  Reported Capital Flows Data and Benchmark-Consistent Flows 
 
U.S. Data on International Capital Flows 
  The most timely source of U.S. data on capital flows is the weekly H4.1 release of U.S. 
government securities held in custody at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York (FRBNY) on 
behalf of foreign official institutions (central banks and finance ministries).  The weekly FRBNY 
custodial data are easily obtained
28 and of high quality; mistakes in FRBNY data are similar to a 
bank recording the wrong amount for an account balance, infrequent and likely quickly corrected.  
But the FRBNY is just one of many custodians that foreign governments might use.  For reported 
U.S. capital flows data, FRBNY is the U.S. custodian of choice for many of the world's central 
banks and finance ministries; at the end of June 2003, 88 percent of reported foreign official 
holdings of long-term Treasury securities were held in custody at the FRBNY.
29  However, some 
foreign governments, notably Middle East oil exporters but also others, avoid the FRBNY and 
thus this source is best described as only partial.   
  A much broader source than the FRBNY is the TIC system as a whole, of which the 
FRBNY data is a subset.  The TIC system reports monthly data on foreigners’ purchases and 
sales of all types of long-term securities (equities as well as corporate, agency, and Treasury 
bonds).
30  As such, the TIC data gives a much fuller picture of international flows into U.S. 
securities, although they are less timely, being released six weeks after month’s end. 
  The TIC system asks data reporters to provide information on the transactions of all 
foreigners and, where possible, the subset that can be attributed to foreign official entities.  Again, 
just as FRBNY data are undermined by foreign governments avoiding it as a custodian, the split 
between foreign official and other foreign investors in the TIC data is blurred by the practice of 
some foreign governments to use third-country intermediaries.  Indeed, there is increasing 
evidence that some governments that are known to accumulate vast amounts of U.S. Treasuries 
(such as oil exporters) are doing so through foreign intermediaries.  In this case the TIC system 
may well capture the flow, but will not attribute it to a foreign official investor or even the 
particular country (if, as is likely, it is executed through an offshore intermediary).   
  Comprehensive benchmark survey data of foreign holdings are undermined by the use of 
third-country custodians.  That said, the benchmark data are the most accurate and can be used to 
make an important point: Of foreigners’ holdings of U.S. Treasury and agency debt securities, the 
majority is held by foreign officials.  Specifically, lower bound estimates (lower bound because 
some foreign official holdings will show up as private holdings) indicate that foreign officials 
hold 63 and 35 percent, respectively, of all foreigners’ holdings of Treasury and agency bonds.
31  
In contrast, foreign officials are not keen on corporate bonds, holding only 3 percent of the total.  
One way of thinking about this is that governments are not usually in the business of investing in, 
or lending to, foreign corporations.  Because much of reported foreigners’ holdings of U.S. 
Treasury and agency bonds are held by foreign officials and it is well known that the TIC system 
is not able to correctly differentiate between foreign officials and other foreign investors (such as 
pension funds, oil stabilization funds, insurance companies, and others) when the trade is made 
                                                 
28  A memo item at the bottom of the first page of the H.4.1 release (www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h41/) 
shows foreign official holdings at the FRBNY.  The Treasury and FRBNY data are not directly comparable 
for a number of reasons; see question C10 on Treasury's FAQ site (www.treas.gov/tic/faq1.html). 
29 From Table 10 of Treasury et al (2004) and the historical Major Foreign Holders table (available at 
www.treas.gov/tic/mfhhis01.txt), foreign official holdings at all U.S. custodians totaled $864 billion ($653 
billion in long-term Treasury securities and another $211 billion in short-term Treasury bills), of which 
$757 billion were held in custody at FRBNY. 
30  The TIC data also include data on short-term instruments and on U.S. investors trading in foreign 
securities.  We do not focus on short-term flows in this paper. 
31  Treasury Department et al. (2005, Table 6).   29 
 
through a third-country intermediary, we will utilize overall TIC foreign flows into Treasury and 
agency bonds in constructing our preferred measure of foreign official accumulation. 
  The benchmark surveys can also be used to address questions about the overall accuracy 
of TIC data (Warnock and Cleaver, 2003).  While we have no direct way of knowing whether the 
TIC capital flows data are accurate, because benchmark surveys of capital flows do not exist, the 
high quality security-level benchmark surveys of foreigners' holdings of U.S. securities—surveys 
that recently have been conducted annually—can be used to gauge whether recorded capital flows 
data are reasonably accurate.  Specifically, one can form flows-based holdings estimates and 
compare them with known holdings from the benchmark surveys.  The comparison is not perfect, 
because unknown valuation adjustments are incorporated into the marked-to-market positions 
data, but large discrepancies between holdings given by the comprehensive benchmark surveys 
and holdings implied from capital flows data would indicate a problem with the flows data. 
  Figure A1 shows flows-based holdings estimates (the solid lines) and benchmark 
amounts (the dots) for foreigners’ positions in Treasury and agency bonds; complete details on 
the methodology for forming the flows-based holdings estimates are presented below.  For 
Treasury bonds, reported TIC flows appear to have run a bit high in the late 1990s; the March 
2000 estimate of $1,063 billion is almost $200 billion higher than the amount collected through 
the benchmark survey.  Since then, however, there is no evidence that TIC flows for Treasury 
bonds are inaccurate, as estimated holdings are right in line with benchmark amounts.  Given that, 
and because it is not entirely clear whether the miss in 2000 owed to errors in TIC data or errors 
in the benchmark survey, we are comfortable using TIC-reported data for Treasury bonds.  
Agency bonds are another story: The TIC system consistently overestimates foreigners’ 
purchases of agency bonds.
32   
 
Forming Benchmark-Consistent Flows 
  The discrepancy between flows implied from high-quality benchmark surveys and TIC 
reported flows makes it difficult for market participants to interpret and use the TIC transactions 
data.  We present a solution that utilizes the benchmark survey data to guide a restatement of 
monthly TIC flows.  The resulting series, which we call benchmark-consistent flows, will be 
quite similar to reported TIC flows when TIC flows are in line with the surveys.  But where there 
is a wide discrepancy between TIC flows and benchmark surveys—as with agency bonds—our 
benchmark-consistent flows will differ substantially from reported TIC flows.   
  To create benchmark-consistent capital flows data, we restate monthly TIC flows so that 
flows-based holdings estimates are consistent with holdings reported in periodic benchmark 
surveys.  We require the following data.  Bilateral capital flows, or foreigners’ transactions in 
U.S. securities, are reported monthly to the TIC System, mainly by brokers and dealers.  For U.S. 
long-term debt securities (with original maturity greater than one year), these mandatory reports 
contain information on gross purchases and gross sales (at market value) and the country of the 
foreign counterparty to the transaction.  The TIC data are available at www.treas.gov/tic.  Data on 
foreign holdings of U.S. securities, available at www.treas.gov/fpis, are collected in detailed but 
infrequent security-level benchmark liabilities surveys conducted in December of 1978, 1984, 
1989, and 1994; March 2000; and June of 2002, 2003, and 2004.
33  Reporting to the surveys is 
mandatory, with penalties for noncompliance, and the data received are subjected to extensive 
                                                 
32 This owes to an inability of the TIC system to cost-effectively collect data on the periodic principal 
payments on mortgage-backed securities—which should be recorded as capital outflows.  The TIC web site 
(www.treas.gov/tic/absprin.html) describes the issue and provides adjustments; however, those adjustments 
appear to be far too small to eliminate the discrepancy. 
33 Details of the 2004 liabilities survey, including findings and methodology, are discussed in Treasury 
Department et al. (2005).  Griever, Lee, and Warnock (2001) is a primer on the surveys. The recent annual 
surveys are “mini” surveys that serve to supplement the quinquennial full benchmarks.     30 
 
analysis and editing.  For liabilities surveys (of foreign holdings of U.S. securities), the reporters 
consist primarily of large custodians (banks and broker-dealers).  U.S. firms that issue securities 
are also included in the survey, but they typically have little information about the actual owners 
of their securities because U.S. securities are typically registered on their books in “street 
name”—that is, in the name of the custodian, not of the ultimate investor. Valuation adjustments 
are from the Lehman Brothers US Treasury Index and the Lehman Brothers US Agency Index.   
The TIC data are reported gross at cost including commissions and taxes, so to compute the value 
of securities bought or sold, an adjustment for transaction costs must be made.  For round-trip 
transaction costs in U.S. debt securities, we rely on estimates of bid-ask spreads provided by 
market participants of 5 basis points on US Treasury debt and 10 basis points on US agency debt.  
  To form benchmark-consistent capital flows data, we first form monthly benchmark-
consistent holdings.  The restated flows consistent with those holdings estimates are our 
benchmark-consistent flows.  We form separate estimates for agency and Treasury bonds.  All 
that follows is for a particular type i of long-term debt security (i=agency, Treasury); we omit the 
subscript i in the equations below. 
  We begin by forming naive baseline estimates.  End-of-month holdings are formed by 
adjusting the previous month’s holdings for estimated price changes and adding the current 
month’s (transaction cost-adjusted) net purchases.  Specifically, we use the following formula to 
form naive estimates of foreign investors’ holdings of U.S. debt securities at the end of period t: 
 
) 1 ( ) 1 ( ) 1 ( 1 tc gs tc gp r nh nh t t t t t + − − + + = −       (A1) 
 
where 
nht   naive estimates of foreign holdings of U.S. bonds at the end of month t  
rt  returns  from  period  t-1 to t, computed from appropriate price indices 
gpt  foreigners’ gross purchases of U.S. bonds during month t 
gst  foreigners’ gross sales of U.S. bonds during month t 
tc  a constant adjustment factor for transaction costs 
 
We then combine the naive baseline estimates with holdings from the infrequent benchmark 
surveys (conducted at time T) to form benchmark-consistent holdings estimates.  For example, to 
form estimates for the January 1995 - March 2000 inter-survey period, we start from the 
December 1994 benchmark survey amount and apply equation (A1) to form estimates to March 
2000.  Doing so results in a naive estimate of holdings as of March 2000 (nh T) that differs from 
holdings as given by the benchmark survey (bhT) by an amount, gapT: 
 
T T T nh bh gap − =          (A2) 
 
One possible cause for the gap is errors in the capital flows data.  Assuming that such errors are 
larger in months with greater trading activity, we add to each inter-survey month an amount that 
is a function of the gap and the proportion of inter-survey trading activity that occurred in that 















* *       (A3) 
 
where periods 1 and T span the entire inter-survey period.  For each inter-survey period, 
everything on the right side of (A3) is given except adjfactor, which we choose to minimize the   31 
 
distance at time T between benchmark holdings and our adjusted holdings estimates: 
 
T T h bh − min           (A4) 
 
where our adjusted holdings estimates, ht, evolve according to 
 
t t t t t t adj tc gs tc gp r h h + + − − + + = − ) 1 ( ) 1 ( ) 1 ( 1     (A5) 
 
and, for all t, we impose a non-negativity constraint on our holdings estimates: 
 
0 ≥ t h            (A6) 
 
Because the adjustment for any period t must be part of the revaluation that produces period t+1 
holdings (and so on), this is not a simple linear problem and, accordingly, we employ a grid-
search method to solve for the adjustment factor.  Once the adjustment factor is determined and 
applied to (A3), our benchmark-consistent flows, or net purchases (npt), are given by 
 
t t t t adj tc gs tc gp np + + − − = ) 1 ( ) 1 (        (A7) 
 
  Note three features of our adjustment factor.  First, adjfactor can differ across inter-
survey periods.  Second, adjfactor is constant within an inter-survey period, but the adjustment 
itself, adjt, is time-varying.  Third, for the period after the last survey we cannot form adjustment 
factors and so apply adjfactor from the previous inter-survey period.  To the extent that the 
relationship between TIC-reported flows and benchmark surveys will change in the future, our 
estimates that post-date the most recent survey should be considered preliminary. 
  Because the TIC data overstate foreign flows into U.S. bonds (Fig. A1), our adjustments 
will generally reduce reported flows.  This is especially true for agency bonds.  For example, in 
the 12-month period from July 2001 to June 2002, the TIC system reported that foreigners 
purchased on net $206 billion in agency bonds, whereas our monthly benchmark-consistent flows 
totaled only $68 billion for the same period.
34 
  
                                                 
34 The BEA also publishes international flows data in their quarterly BOP release.  For long-term securities, 
the quarterly BOP data is formed essentially by summing the monthly TIC data.  However, BEA adjusts 
reported TIC data if they feel it is warranted.  BEA's determines whether TIC flows data should be altered 
by consulting the infrequent benchmark positions data, so their adjustment is similar in spirit to ours. 
Benchmark-consistent flows for the component of overall bond inflows are not available prior to 1994, so 
pre-1994 our preferred measure utilizes reported TIC data.     32 
 
Table 1:  Baseline Model of Ten-Year Treasury Yield 
Column 1 presents baseline OLS regressions explaining the 10-year Treasury yield,  10 , t i .  The 














t 10 + π  and 
e
t 1 + π are 10-year- and 1-year-ahead inflation expectations;  t ff is the federal funds rate; 
t rp is an interest rate risk premium; 
e
t y 1 +  is expected real GDP growth over the next year; and  1 − t deficit is 
the structural budget deficit (scaled by lagged GDP).  Column 2 is identical except that the dependent 
variable is real 10-year Treasury yield,  10 , t r , calculated as 
e
t t i 10 10 , + −π  (and  
e
t 10 + π  is thus omitted as an 
explanatory variable).  Standard errors are reported in parentheses (robust to heteroskedasticity and serial 
correlation).  Highly significant coefficients (at the 1% level) are shown in bold; 
a and 
b denote significance 
at the 5% and 10% levels, respectively.  Constants included but not reported.  The sample is monthly from 




























Nominal 10-year yield 
 
Real 10-year yield 
 (1)  (2) 
10
e




tt π π ++ −   0.22 (0.19)  0.01 (0.22) 
1
e
t y +   0.07 (0.07)  0.22 (0.07) 
t rp   5.37 (0.64)  3.02 (0.79) 
t ff   0.43 (0.03)  0.42 (0.03) 
1 − t deficit   0.24 (0.03)  0.04 (0.03) 
    
2 R   0.89  0.80   33 
 
 
Table 2:  Extended Model of Ten-Yield Treasury Yield 
Columns 1 and 2 present results of OLS regressions explaining the nominal 10-year Treasury yield,  10 , t i , 














t 10 + π  and 
e
t 1 + π are 10-year- and 1-year-ahead inflation expectations;  t ff is the federal funds rate; 
t rp is an interest rate risk premium; 
e
t y 1 +  is expected real GDP growth over the next year;  1 − t deficit is the 
structural budget deficit (scaled by lagged GDP); and t foreign is 12-month foreign official flows into U.S. 
Treasury and agency bonds, either benchmark-consistent (columns 1 and 3) or TIC-reported (columns 2 
and 4), both scaled by lagged GDP.  Columns 3 and 4 are identical except that the dependent variable is 
real 10-year Treasury yield,  10 , t r , calculated as 
e
t t i 10 10 , + −π  (and  
e
t 10 + π  is thus omitted as an explanatory 
variable).  In all columns, standard errors are reported in parentheses (robust to heteroskedasticity and serial 
correlation).  Highly significant coefficients (at the 1% level) are shown in bold;
 a and 
b denote significance 
at the 5% and 10% levels, respectively.  Constants included but not reported.  The sample is monthly from 
January 1984 to May 2005.  Yields are measured in percentage points. 
 
DepVar: 
  Nominal 10-year yield  Real 10-year yield 
  (1)  (2)  (3) (4) 
10
e
t π +   0.64 (0.03)  0.67 (0.03)     
11 0
ee
tt π π ++ −   0.65 (0.19)  0.84 (0.20)  0.17 (0.22)  0.19 (0.23) 
1
e
t y +   0.26 (0.07)  0.24 (0.07)  0.22 (0.07)  0.22 (0.07) 
t rp   4.82 (0.64)  5.89 (0.63)  3.08 (0.76)  3.23 (0.78) 
t ff   0.36 (0.03)  0.33 (0.03)  0.38 (0.03)  0.38 (0.03) 
1 − t deficit   0.21 (0.03)  0.21 (0.03)  0.05
b(0.03) 0.05
b(0.03) 
t foreign   -0.25 (0.03)  -0.61 (0.06)  -0.10 (0.03)  -0.22 (0.07) 
      
2 R   0.90 0.89 0.81 0.81 
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Table 3. Foreign Holdings of Long-term U.S. Debt Securities ($ billions) 
 
      December 1978  December 1994  March 2000   June 2005 
Issuer:         
 Treasury  Outstanding  326  2,392  2,508  3,093 
   Foreign  Owned  39  464  884  1,599 
    % Foreign Owned  12.0%  19.4%  35.2%  51.7% 
          
 Agencies  Outstanding  180  1,982  3,575  5,591 
   Foreign  Owned  5  107  261  791 
    % Foreign Owned  2.8%  5.4%  7.3%  14.1% 
          
 Corporates  Outstanding  715  3,556  5,713  8,858 
   Foreign  Owned  7  276  703  1,729 
    % Foreign Owned  1.0%  7.8%  12.3%  19.5% 
          
All U.S. Issuers  Outstanding  1,221  7,930  11,796  17,542 
   Foreign  Owned  51  847  1,848  4,119 
    % Foreign Owned  4.2%  10.7%  15.7%  23.5% 
 
Source: Table 2 of Department of Treasury et al. (2005, 2006).   35 
 
Table 4:  Alternative Specifications of the Extended Model 
The first column presents OLS regressions explaining the 10-year Treasury yield,  10 , t i , using domestic 
variables, a foreign flows variable, and a corporate savings variable: 








t t fingap h foreign g deficit f y e rp d c ff b b a i ε π π π + + + + + + − + − + + = − + + + + ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 1 ( 1 1 10 1 10 10 ,
where 
e
t 10 + π  and 
e
t 1 + π are 10-year- and 1-year-ahead inflation expectations;  t ff is the federal funds rate; 
t rp is an interest rate risk premium; 
e
t y 1 +  is expected real GDP growth over the next year;  1 − t deficit is the 
structural budget deficit (scaled by lagged GDP);  t foreign is 12-month benchmark-consistent foreign 
official flows into U.S. Treasury and agency bonds scaled by lagged GDP; and  t fingap  is the financing 
gap (from Federal Reserve Flow of Funds (Table F. 102, line 59)) scaled by GDP.  In column (2), the 
dependent variable is future expected long rates (the real 5-5 forward rate, 5 5 , − t r ); only longer-term 
domestic variables and a global foreign flows variable are included in that model.  Columns (3) and (4) are 
the standard regressions from Table 2 column (1) but with start dates that correspond to known changes in 
monetary policy: August 1987 (when Greenspan became Fed Chairman) and February 1994 (when the Fed 
began announcing changes in the target Fed Funds rate).  Standard errors are reported in parentheses 
(robust to heteroskedasticity and serial correlation).  Highly significant coefficients (at the 1% level) are 
shown in bold; 
a and 
b denote significance at the 5% and 10% levels, respectively.  Constants included but 
not reported.  Unlike other regressions in this paper, the regressions in column 1 utilize a quarterly sample.  
Yields are measured in percentage points. 








  (1)  (2) (3) (4) 
10
e
t π +   0.59 (0.07)    0.64 (0.03)  0.58 (0.04) 
11 0
ee
tt π π ++ −   0.45 (0.35)    0.04 (0.16)  0.01 (0.23) 
1
e
t y +   0.28
b(0.13)    -0.04 (0.05)  -0.09 (0.07) 
t rp   4.82 (1.04)  10.2 (0.60)  1.88 (0.61)  19.7 (3.57) 
t ff   0.41 (0.07)    0.36 (0.03)  0.42 (0.04) 
1 − t deficit   0.19 (0.04)  0.19 (0.02)  0.25 (0.02)  0.26 (0.04) 




-0.13 (0.09)      
       
Sample  1984:Q1 – 
2005:Q1 
Jan. 1984 – 
May 2005 
Aug. 1987 – 
May 2005 
Feb. 1994 – 
May 2005 
       
2 R   0.90 0.86  0.90 0.75   36 
 
Table 5:  Model Including Interest Rate Differentials or Exchange Rate 
The table presents OLS regressions explaining the 10-year Treasury yield,  10 , t i , using domestic variables, a 
global foreign flows variable, and (alternately) a real interest rate differential or real exchange rate variable: 








t t X h foreign g deficit f y e rp d c ff b b a i ε π π π + + + + + + − + − + + = − + + + + ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 1 ( 1 1 10 1 10 10 ,
where 
e
t 10 + π  and 
e
t 1 + π are 10-year- and 1-year-ahead inflation expectations;  t ff is the federal funds rate; 
t rp is an interest rate risk premium; 
e
t y 1 +  is expected real GDP growth over the next year;  1 − t deficit is the 
structural budget deficit (scaled by lagged GDP);  t foreign is 12-month benchmark-consistent foreign 
official flows into U.S. Treasury and agency bonds scaled by lagged GDP; and  t X  is either a (real) interest 
rate differential (calculated as the spread of foreign interest rates over U.S. rates, where foreign rates are a 
simple average of long rates in Germany, Japan, and the UK) or year-over-year changes in the real 
exchange rate (given by the Federal Reserve’s broad real exchange rate, for which an increase is dollar 
appreciation).  Standard errors are reported in parentheses (robust to heteroskedasticity and serial 
correlation).  Highly significant coefficients (at the 1% level) are shown in bold; 
a and 
b denote significance 
at the 5% and 10% levels, respectively.  Constants included but not reported.  Yields are measured in 
percentage points. 
DepVar:  Nominal 10-
year yield 
Nominal 10-
year yield  
  (1) (2) 
10
e
t π +   0.78 (0.03)  0.70 (0.03) 
11 0
ee
tt π π ++ −   1.17 (0.19)  1.50 (0.17) 
1
e
t y +   0.05 (0.06)  0.07 (0.06) 
t rp   2.10 (0.51)  4.22 (0.62) 
t ff   0.22 (0.03)  0.30 (0.03) 
1 − t deficit   0.20 (0.02)  0.31 (0.03) 
t foreign   -0.32 (0.03)  -0.24 (0.02) 
r r − *  
 
  -0.43 (0.04) 
 
 





  0.07 (0.01) 
    
2 R   0.92 0.92 
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Table 6:  Models of Other Long-Term Interest Rates 
OLS regressions explaining the Aaa corporate bond rate (column 1), Baa corporate bond rate (column 2), 










t t foreign h deficit g y f rp e cycle d c ff b b a i ε π π π + + + + + + − + − + + = − + + + + ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 1 ( 1 1 10 1 10
 
 
where  t i  is the nominal interest rate (Aaa, Baa, or 30-year fixed); 
e
t 10 + π  and 
e
t 1 + π are 10-year- and 1-year-
ahead inflation expectations;  t cycle  is a business cycle indicator computed as the real-time change in 
employment relative to its 36-month average;  t ff is the federal funds rate;  t rp is an interest rate risk 
premium; 
e
t y 1 +  is expected real GDP growth over the next year;  1 − t deficit is the structural budget deficit 
(scaled by lagged GDP); and t foreign is 12-month benchmark-consistent foreign official flows into U.S. 
Treasury and agency bonds scaled by lagged GDP.  Standard errors are reported in parentheses (robust to 
heteroskedasticity and serial correlation).  Highly significant coefficients (at the 1% level) are shown in 
bold; 
a and 
b denote significance at the 5% and 10% levels, respectively.  Constants included but not 











  (1) (2)  (3) 
10
e
t π +   0.78 (0.02)  0.85 (0.03)  0.63 (0.03) 
11 0
ee
tt π π ++ −   0.34
a(0.15) 0.26
b(0.15)  0.21  (0.15) 
1
e
t y +   0.19 (0.06)  0.14
a (0.06)  0.20 (0.06) 
t cycle   -0.03
 (0.16) -0.34
b (0.18)  -0.08 (0.17) 
t rp   5.12 (0.53)  8.09 (0.57)  5.42 (0.60) 
t ff   0.22 (0.02)  0.15 (0.03)  0.37 (0.03) 
1 − t deficit    0.02 (0.02)  0.01 (0.02)   0.13 (0.02) 
t foreign   -0.30 (0.03)  -0.37 (0.03)  -0.29 (0.03) 
      
2 R   0.92 0.93  0.94   38 
 
Table 7:  Regression Results for Short-Term Rates 
OLS regressions explaining the 2-year Treasury yield (column 1) and the 1-year ARM (column 2).  The 










t t foreign h deficit g y f rp e cycle d c ff b b a i ε π π π + + + + + + − + − + + = − + + + + ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 1 ( 1 1 10 1 10
 
where  t i  is the nominal interest rate (2-year Treasury or 1-year ARM); 
e
t 10 + π  and 
e
t 1 + π are 10-year- and 1-
year-ahead inflation expectations;  t cycle  is a business cycle indicator computed as the real-time change in 
employment relative to its 36-month average;  t ff is the federal funds rate;  t rp is an interest rate risk 
premium; 
e
t y 1 +  is expected real GDP growth over the next year;  1 − t deficit is the structural budget deficit 
(scaled by lagged GDP); and t foreign is 12-month benchmark-consistent foreign official flows into U.S. 
Treasury and agency bonds scaled by lagged GDP.  Standard errors are reported in parentheses (robust to 
heteroskedasticity and serial correlation).  Highly significant coefficients (at the 1% level) are shown in 
bold; 
a and 
b denote significance at the 5% and 10% levels, respectively.  Constants included but not 






Treasury  1-year ARM 
  (1) (2) 
10
e
t π +   0.19 (0.03)  0.46 (0.02) 
11 0
ee
tt π π ++ −   0.41
a(0.16)   -0.19 (0.13) 
1
e
t y +   0.16 (0.06)  0.37 (0.05) 
t cycle   0.81
 (0.19) -0.79  (0.16) 
t rp   1.51
a (0.60)  5.22 (0.57) 
t ff   0.81 (0.03)  0.54 (0.02) 
1 − t deficit    0.09 (0.03)  -0.08 (0.02) 
t foreign   -0.11 (0.03)  -0.18 (0.02) 
    
2 R   0.95 0.96   39 
 
Figure 1. Explanatory Variables 
(a) Inflation expectations: one-year ahead (thin line) and ten-years ahead (thick line).   
 
 




















(b)  Interest rate volatility, computed as the standard deviation of changes in 10-year yields using a lagging 
36 month window. 
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(c) One-year ahead growth expectations (thin line) and structural budget deficit scaled by GDP (thick line). 

























(d)  Target federal funds rate (thin line) and the 10-year yield (thick line). 
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Figure 2.  Foreign Inflows into U.S. Government Bonds 
Both variables are 12-month flows scaled by lagged GDP.  The thick line represents foreign official flows 
into U.S. government bonds as reported to the TIC system.  The thin line is based on our benchmark-
consistent flows, which are described in detail in the appendix. 
Foreign Official Purchases of US Government Bonds
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Figure 3:  Impact of Foreign Flows into US Bonds on 10-year Treasury Yields 
(a) Impact is calculated from the coefficient estimates in Columns 1 (thick line) and 2 (thin line) of Table 2. 
 


















(b) Fitted values (thin line) are calculated from the regression in Column 1 of Table 2. 
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Figure 4:  Decomposition of Foreign Flows  
 
(a) Flows decomposed into those originating from East Asia* (thick line) and elsewhere. 
East Asian and Other Flows into U.S. Government Bonds

















(b) Impact of East Asian* (thick line) and other inflows. 


















* In this exhibit, East Asia refers to Japan, China, Hong Kong, Taiwan, and Korea.   44 
 
Figure A1.  TIC-based Estimates of Foreign Positions in U.S. Bonds 
TIC-based estimates start from benchmark survey amounts, shown by the large circles, and are formed by 
applying equation (A1); see the appendix for details.  While unknowable valuation adjustments are also 
included in these estimates, major discrepancies in TIC-based estimates and the benchmark surveys are 
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